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Abstract
This paper starts by showing that Chile and Malaysia are on the path of escaping the mid-
dle-income trap in terms of their income level relative to that of the USA. In contrast to 
the conventional view, we find that the leading export sectors are not manufacturing (such 
as electronics) in Malaysia or mining alone in Chile. Instead, the engines of growth have 
been (1) resource-based sectors (petroleum, rubber and palm oil) in Malaysia; and (2) non-
mining resource-based sectors (salmon, fruits, wine and wood-based) in Chile. Further-
more, the sustained growth of these sectors is not the result of free-markets, as frequently 
argued, but also of specific industrial policy measures, that have enabled the accumulation 
of productive and innovation capabilities through R&D support, fiscal incentives, export 
assistance, and quality control. We also find that the emergence of locally-controlled firms 
has been an important aspect of this long-term success, although the sources of the initial 
learning included foreign actors and FDI. The cases of Chile and Malaysia consequently 
show the possibility of escaping the middle-income trap not through manufacturing but 
instead through resource-based development. Such strategy differs from the so-called 
short cycle technology-based catch-up by the East Asian tigers and from the unsustainable 
commodity rent-extraction in resource-rich countries, but is consistent with the view that 
emphasizes the need to specialize in sectors with low entry barriers, and to promote invest-
ments in innovation and technological capabilities.
Keywords Resource-based development · Industrial policy · Chile · Malaysia · Middle-
income trap · Salmon · Palm oil
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1 Introduction
The so-called middle-income trap (MIT) refers to a situation where middle-income 
economies tend to face a decelerated growth and consequently fail to join the rank of 
high-income economies. According to World Bank (2012:12), a country can be consid-
ered in the MIT if its per capita income remains in the 20 to 40% range of the US per 
capita income for several decades. While the majority of middle-income economies 
are still in this trap, the East Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan Hong Kong and Singa-
pore) are amongst some of the few examples of countries that have escaped this trap. 
Nevertheless, recently, there are some signs that Malaysia and Chile are also overcom-
ing the MIT, as both economies have reached more than 40% of the level of US per 
capita income. This paper explains how both countries have been able to escape the 
trap by investigating which sectors are leading their growth and exports in particular, 
and how policies helped in this regard.
The cases of Chile and Malaysia can shed a new light on the debate relating to 
the middle-income trap and economic growth in the latecomer economies. If Malay-
sia is escaping the MIT, it raises the puzzle of how it has achieved such performance 
despite its perceived failure in automotive industry and mixed success in the electron-
ics industry (Cherif and Hasanov 2019a; Rasiah 2006; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009). 
Chile is also an interesting case because it has been a symbol of so-called neo-liber-
alism in Latin America as it followed the free-market oriented Washington Consensus 
for many years (Williamson 1990), which was perceived largely as a failure (Rodrik 
2006). In fact, several scholars have praised Chile for its success through its free mar-
ket approach (Barro 2000; Valenzuela and Dammert 2006), and even Stiglitz (2002) 
considered Chile  as an exceptional success despite the unregulated free market-ori-
ented policy regime. So, the question is whether Chile’s growth is owing to its liberal 
policies or something else.
In this paper we argue that governments in both economies have succeeded through 
active industrial policy interventions to promote not manufacturing but several lead-
ing resource-based sectors, such as petroleum, rubber and palm oil sectors in Malay-
sia, and salmon, fruits, wine and forestry in Chile. In Malaysia, these resource-based 
industries have shown great degrees of linkage development, competitiveness and 
technological sophistication, notably through governmental support for R&D activi-
ties, in contrast to the weak performances of the Malaysian electrical and electron-
ics (E&E) and automotive sectors. In Chile, the successful emergence of competitive 
export industries since the 1960 s has helped sustain growth beyond the copper sector, 
and we show that this has been related to long-term policies building local capabilities 
in production and innovation through both vertical and horizontal interventions.
The next section discusses the literature analysing the MIT and lays out the theoreti-
cal framework we follow in the paper. Then, Sect. 3 provides evidence that Chile and 
Malaysia are on the path to escaping the MIT, mainly through exports of new leading 
sectors, which tend to be all resource-based, and different from the traditional leading 
sectors. The fourth and fifth sections investigate the underlying mechanisms for build-
ing local capabilities in production and innovation and for managing the local-foreign 
interface in the leading resource-based sectors in both countries. The concluding sec-
tion summarizes the findings of this study.
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2  The middle‑income trap and our theoretical framework
The existence of a ‘middle income trap’ (MIT) was first mentioned by Gill and Kharas 
(2007) and has since gained popularity amongst scholars and international institutions (e.g. 
Cherif and Hasanov 2019a, b; Eichengreen et al. 2012, 2013; Ito 2017; Lee 2013; World 
Bank 2010). However, some scholars have rejected the existence of this trap on the ground 
that there is no reason to believe that middle-income economies adopt different growth 
mechanisms (e.g. Aiyar et  al. 2013; Han and Wei 2017; Im and Rosenblatt 2013). The 
debate and conflicting views over the past decade regarding the existence of the MIT are 
due to the differences in definitions of the trap and different methodologies to test its exist-
ence (Lee 2019). Regardless of its existence, it is clear that many middle-income econo-
mies are struggling to achieve high-income status, and it is therefore a relevant issue.1
Diverse studies have tried to investigate the key factors responsible for the MIT, such as 
demographic conditions, institutions, industry and trade structures, diversification, physi-
cal infrastructure, and macro-financial developments (Aiyar et  al. 2013). One argument, 
supported by the ADB-sponsored study of Eichengreen et al. (2012, 2013) and Lee (2013), 
is that innovation capabilities are the key binding constraint for the MIT. This view is also 
consistent with the early statement by the World Bank that middle-income economies 
would tend to fall under a trap because they get caught between low-wage manufacturers 
and high-wage innovators; their wage rates are too high to compete with low-wage export-
ers and the level of their technological capability is too low to enable them to compete with 
advanced countries (World Bank 2010). The importance of innovation as the cause of the 
MIT is also consistent with the experience of a very small number of East Asian econo-
mies that successfully transitioned into high-income economies in the past decades. These 
include South Korea and Taiwan that, since the mid-1980 s, due to their growing innova-
tion capabilities, made a transition from low-wage based to high-end goods economy (Lee 
2013; Ch. 3).
If one asks who creates and promotes such innovation capabilities, the answer from East 
Asia is that they are locally-controlled companies, and many of them have initially learned 
from foreign MNCs or through the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) arrange-
ments with MNCs. Amsden (1989) is one of the early studies that emphasizes the impor-
tance of promoting local ownership rather than passive reliance on Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI). The success of Taiwanese catch-up is also supported by the eventual rise of 
indigenous firms (Amsden and Chu 2003, Guerrieri et al. 2001). A similar view is shared 
by Marin and Bell (2006), who observe that the spillover effects of FDI does not occur 
if host countries do not focus on the linkages between FDI and the domestic economy. 
Lee et al. (2016) and Lee and Lim (2001) observe that FDI can be an important channel 
for gaining foreign knowledge, but tends to interfere with the eventual growth of indig-
enous technological capabilities.2 Then, indigenous ownership becomes more important at 
1 A study by the World Bank (2012: 12) finds that only 12 out of 101 middle-income economies have 
reached the status of high-income economy since 1960.
2 These remarks are based on comparable examples in the automotive sectors of China and Korea (e.g., 
Geely and Chery vs. Shanghai Volkswagen and First Auto Works in China, and Hyundai Motors vs. GM-
Daewoo in Korea).
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later stage, because foreign firms tend to become increasingly reluctant to transfer or sell 
technology.3
For latecomers, participating in global value chains (GVC) offers opportunities to access 
export markets by specializing in specific segments, with a hope to gradually upgrade into 
high–end segments. Relatedly, Lee et al. (2018) introduced the “In-Out-In Again” pattern 
in terms of the changing degree of participation in GVCs. The idea was that at the ini-
tial stage of growth by a latecomer, increased participation in GVC is necessary to learn 
foreign knowledge and production skills. In the effort to functionally upgrade at the mid-
dle-income stage, countries must seek separation and independence from existing foreign-
dominated GVCs to increase domestic value-added. Finally, after establishing their local 
value chains, latecomer firms and economies may have to seek reintegration into the GVC, 
often leading the chains themselves. However, this is only one of the many possible ways 
GVCs and their governance coevolve with innovation systems (Lema et al. 2019). In fact, 
many countries remain stuck in low-value-added activities along the GVC, if they do not 
exert the necessary complementary efforts to develop technologies and capabilities (Mor-
rison et al. 2008).
Creating and strengthening technological capabilities has often not been easy in emerg-
ing economies, due to the presence of not only market failures but also system and learn-
ing failures (Lee 2019: 40; Table 2.1). The existence of such failures justifies public inter-
ventions to provide opportunities to learn and develop technological capabilities, often in 
diverse private-public collaborative modes, with the engagement of public research organi-
zations. However, such interventions require careful assessment of their costs and benefits.
One important criterion to consider for policy interventions relates to the magnitude 
of entry barriers for newcomers. In this paper, we argue that resource-based sectors tend 
to be associated with lower entry barriers than most manufacturing sectors, depending 
upon natural endowment and historical legacies. Thus, resource-based sectors would be 
an alternative to short-cycle manufacturing or services (e.g. IT), meeting the criterion of 
low entry barriers for latecomers.4 Figure 1 summarizes the above discussion, as it explains 
that the MIT is caused by weak innovation capabilities, which requires public intervention 
or industrial policy to overcome due to several market failures; and that such interventions 
can lead to successful outcomes only when they lead to the eventual growth of indigenous 
firms in certain sectors with low entry barrier in terms of international competition.
In addition to the short-cycle technology-based catch up in manufacturing or services, 
and the resource-based development pathway discussed here, Fig. 1 also indicates another 
escape route from the MIT, that is not analysed in detail here, but that may prove useful to 
make our point regarding our country cases. This route is typically followed by countries 
with high commodity rents per capita, such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, or Equatorial Guinea, 
whose economic model is not really sustainable in the long term as it is highly vulner-
able to commodity price fluctuations, and reversible.5 Moreover, most oil exporters have 
recorded poor productivity growth and witnessed relative income decline compared to the 
4 Lee (2019) points out that at the middle-income stages, Korea and Taiwan went through a different path 
by specializing in sectors with “short-cycle” technologies (Lee 2013), which can be considered as low entry 
barrier sectors in that technologies dominated by incumbents tend to be disrupted radically and frequently.
5 See the example of Nauru, a country with the highest GDP per capita in the world in the 1970 s due to 
the rents generated by the sale of phosphate of more than USD 27,000 per capita, that fell back dramatically 
after the exhaustion of their deposits (Trumbull 1982).
3 An example was observed in Korea when Korean IC chip firms caught up with foreign firms, and the lat-
ter became increasingly reluctant to provide designs for chip production (Kim 1997, Lee and Lim 2001).
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United States over the last 30 years (Cherif et al. 2016). Such ‘resource rents extraction-
based’ development model remarkably differs from the resource-based development path-
ways of Chile and Malaysia analysed in this paper, which focuses to larger extent on the 
development of upstream and downstream linkages around commodity extraction, and on 
the development of new resource-based activities with considerable knowledge and tech-
nological spillovers. Importantly, this distinction echoes Schumpeter’s (1943) difference 
between the rents created through innovation and those by statically maximising profits by 
appropriating higher rents from existing resources. Taking the above discussion further, in 
Sects. 4 and 5 we investigate the cases of Chile and Malaysia.
3  Growth beyond the middle‑income trap and leading sectors
3.1  Growth beyond the MIT
This section evidences that Chile and Malaysia appear to have recently achieved- or are 
close to transitioning towards- a high-income status. First, Fig. 2 suggests that Chile and 
Malaysia, unlike most other middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, 
or Algeria, have been growing at faster rates in the past decades. In 1990, the per capita 
income levels of these two countries were similar to to Brazil and Algeria but lower than 
Mexico. By 2017, these two economies surpassed Mexico, and reached the level of USD 
23,000 or higher, which is far ahead of Brazil or Algeria, below USD 15,000.
One way the literature has determined whether a country is beyond the middle-
income trap is by measuring a country’s relative income level to the USA. According 
Fig. 1  Possible Transitions from Middle-Income Traps. Source: Authors’ elaboration
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to the World Bank (2012: 12), a country can be considered in the trap if its per capita 
income remains in the 20 to 40% range of the US per capita income for several decades. 
The same study shows that only 13 economies escaped the trap during 1960–2008. Our 
calculations show that both Malaysia and Chile have escaped the MIT since the 2010 s 
(IMF data). In 2017, Malaysia and Chile respectively reached 46.3% and 41.9% of US 
income (Fig.  3). Most emerging economies have not closed the gap with the USA, 
remaining below the 40% threshold. Mexico’s GDP per capita declined from above 40% 
in the mid-1980 s to 32.8% of the US’ GDP in 2015. Brazil and South Africa’s GDP per 
capita have also dropped to below 30% since the 1980 s.
Fig. 2  GDP per capita in selected countries. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2018)
Fig. 3  GDP per capita as  % of US GDP per capita in selected countries. Source: Drawn by the authors 
using the data from International Monetary Fund (2017)
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3.2  The leading sectors in Malaysia and Chile
This subsection compares the export performance of the resource-based sectors with ‘tradi-
tional’ leading sectors in Chile and Malaysia. We focus on export performance, as develop-
ing countries must earn hard currencies through exporting to pay for the imported capital 
goods that are required for investments and sustained economic growth (Ramanayake and 
Lee 2019).
Resource-based industries have been an engine of exports in both Chile and Malaysia. 
In Chile the combined export share of new resource-based industries (the salmon, wine, 
fruit and wood-based industries)6 has reached 28% by 2017, becoming the second larg-
est contributor to exports after mining (55%).7 In Malaysia the combined export share of 
resource-based industries (petroleum, palm oil and rubber) reached 21% in 2017, following 
the E&E sector, which represents an export share of 38%.
More importantly, these sectors are contributing to large and increasing trade sur-
pluses. Figure 4 shows that the combined trade surplus of the key resource sectors in 
Malaysia has even become larger than that of the E&E sector since 2007. In contrast, 
the contribution of the latter has been mostly stagnant since 2000. Figure 5 shows that 
the contribution of mining in Chile peaked in 2011 and declined since then, whereas 
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the combined share of key resources has been steadily increasing, reaching almost half 
of the amount of mining. In contrast, machinery & equipment and other manufacturing 
sectors have recorded ever-increasing deficits.
These results are consistent with the revealed comparative advantages of selected 
sectors of the two countries (See “Appendix” Figs. 8 and 9). RCA values larger than one 
indicate that that product of that country is internationally competitive, which is for the 
cases of resource sectors of Chile, such as wine, fish, fruits and wood-based products, 
with higher than 6 since 1995. RCA values in key resource sectors of Malaysia are also 
high, such as palm oil products (30 or higher), rubber and fuels (higher than 1), whereas 
the automobile sector corresponds to RCA values always less than 0.2 throughout the 
period.
However, are these resource-based exports mainly unprocessed resources, generating 
little domestic value-added? We have some insightful details for Malaysia. Figures 6 and 7 
show that a progressive downstream value addition has taken place in the exports of these 
three sectors since the 1960  s. The share of crude rubber and crude petroleum has both 
decreased from over 90% in 1960 to less than 30% in 2010 s (Fig. 6). In contrast, the share 
of rubber-based manufactured products increased to over 50% of total rubber exports by 
2012, while the share of petroleum-based products increased from less than 10% to over 
70% of petroleum products by 2014. The same evidence for processed palm oil exports 
is shown in Fig. 7. Transition from exporting crude to processed palm oil is a distinctive 
achievement of Malaysia, which did not happen in Indonesia in the same period (Sato 
2016).
With regard to Chile, the new resource sectors are highly sophisticated and technology-
intensive. For example, salmon production requires technologies, such as cold storage sys-
tems, vaccines, and the transportation of fresh products to distant geographical markets 
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(Lebdioui 2019c). Wood-based products also include diverse kinds of value-added prod-
ucts, such as pulp, paper, paperboard, cork, and furniture.
4  Industrial policy and upgrading in key sectors of Chile
Over the last five decades, Chile has experienced an interesting (but uneven) process of 
upgrading and capability building at the sector level.  Some sectors, such as wine and 
salmon, have become increasingly technology-intensive, with significant R&D activity, 
growing importance in world markets, and high levels of cooperation between firms and 
research institutions (Benavente and Goya 2012). For instance, firms in the salmon sector 
have gradually closed the technological gap with frontier capabilities (Iizuka et al. 2016). 
In contrast, most mining suppliers still classify as displaying average or low capacity in 
production management and adaptation of available technologies, while no local mining 
supplier is yet operating at the knowledge frontier (Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz 2015). The 
next two sections examine more closely the key sectors that have acted as an engine of 
growth in Chile in the past five decades.
4.1  New resource sectors: salmon, fruits, wood‑based products and wine
Despite the predominance of copper in Chile’s export basket, still over 50% of total exports 
in 2017, Chile has undergone a process of export diversification since the 1960 s, spurred 
by the emergence of new globally competitive tradable sectors such as salmon, fruits, wine 
and wood-based sectors. Chile’s diversification strategy has focused on the identification 
of niche areas with potential for comparative advantage. However, as further argued below, 
this has not only been the result of free-market processes, but it has been achieved as a 
result of sector-specific initiatives for long-term investments and capability building, which 
we may call broadly industrial policy, both of a vertical and horizontal nature (Lebdioui 
2019c). As discussed below, vertical interventions were more prominent in salmon, fruits 
and forestry, whereas the wine sector featured mostly horizontal interventions.
Chile’s salmon, fresh fruits, wine and wood-based industries offer remarkable examples 
of key interventions of the state that fostered their initial development, always in the frame-
work of an open market economy. In each of these sectors, there were key public actors 
that fostered its initial development (Lebdioui 2019c). In the case of the wood-based sec-
tor, since the 1960 s CORFO (Production Development Corporation of Chile) subsidized 
investments in planting of pino radiata, a non-native tree (CEPAL 1986, Pietrobelli 1993).8 
For salmon harvesting technologies and the introduction of new fruit varieties, such as ber-
ries, the role of the public-private Fundación Chile was central (Pietrobelli 1998). Another 
essential feature of these nascent industries was the integration and adaptation of imported 
knowledge and technologies with local knowledge. What follows is an elaboration for each 
sector.
8 CORFO was created following the earthquake that struck Chile in 1939 to reconstruct the country’s 
industrial base through energy, mining, fishing, agriculture and infrastructure projects. In 2015, the finan-
cial support deployed by CORFO amounted to around USD 3 billion, which represents 1% of Chile’s GDP 
(Griffith-Jones et al. 2018).
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The wood-based sector is the sector that the Chilean government targeted most 
explicitly since the 1960  s (Pietrobelli 1998). At the time, the government made “a 
strategic bet on a non-existent but potentially profitable sector with latent comparative 
advantage” as it was known that radiata pine grew faster in certain parts of Chile than 
the rest of the world (Agosin et al. 2010:7). Thus, since the 1960 s CORFO subsidized 
investments in planting pino radiata (CEPAL 1986, Pietrobelli 1993). Technological 
and industrial upgrading subsequently followed owing not only to these subsidies but 
also to explicit promotion measures, such as bans on exports of raw wood and debarked 
logs, as well as the attraction of investments from leading producers of wood fiber and 
wood-based products (Rossi 1995; Lebdioui 2019c). So, there was a strong flow of FDI, 
especially from New Zealand, often in alliances with domestic companies already estab-
lished within the sector. Since then, locally owned firms flourished, possibly owing to 
subsidized credits by the central bank through Decreto Ley 701 & 2565, and local ini-
tiatives for R&D were met by the Forestry Institute. Decreto Ley 701, passed in 1974, 
granted cash subsidies of 75% of the costs of planting and the initial management of 
forests (Decreto Ley 2565 increasing the subsidy to 90%). Public expenditures through 
subsidies and grants in the 20 years of application of the law Decreto Ley 701 amounted 
to USD 135 million. Total wood-based exports consequently rose from USD 127 mil-
lion in 1974 (year of enactment of the Decreto Ley 701) to USD 1.5 billion in 1994, 
when the terms of the law ended (Rossi 1995). Nowadays, wood-based exports consti-
tute Chile’s fourth largest export item, with 9% of the total.
In both the salmon and fresh fruit industry, the comparative advantage Chile devel-
oped was not natural, but instead was acquired through the accumulation of human capital, 
technology and learning combined with favourable natural endowments. Both industries 
emerged as a result of technology transfer programs at the governmental level (through 
the Japan Chile Salmon project and the Chile-California programme to train agriculture 
engineers). Fundación Chile (FCh) has also played a key role in the experimentation into 
new activities with latent comparative advantage, developing pioneers and then promoting 
them as examples to follow through technology diffusion. Indeed, FCh’s mandate as a not-
for-profit semi-public agency enabled to treat R&D and technology as “public goods” to 
be widely diffused amongst local entrepreneurs, in order to stimulate emulation and reduce 
entry barriers in new industries. This role has strongly encouraged Chile’s upgrading in the 
salmon and fruits sectors through the creation of ‘display’ firms, such as Salmones Antar-
tica in the salmon sector and Berries La Unión in the fruit sector.
Besides FCh, there are also public research units in charge of R&D, such as Institute of 
Agricultural Research (INIA) in fruits, and Fisheries Development Institute and Fisheries 
Development Fund in the salmon sector. These public R&D agencies have been instrumen-
tal in enhancing the capabilities of local firms to start developing their own technologies to 
meet their unique challenges and environment (Hosono 2010, 2016; Iizuka and Gebreeye-
sus 2012). Indeed, evidence reveals that Chile has registered many patents for salmon vac-
cines, bio-testing, and developed quality control labs, alongside salmon farming (Hosono 
2010).
The wine sector in Chile has a long history, and thus its strong export growth in recent 
periods can be considered as an instance of export ‘discovery’ favoured by foreign direct 
investment (FDI), rather than a case of product discovery, as in the cases of the salmon 
and fruits sectors  (Agosín and Bravo-Ortega 2009). Interestingly, in the wine sector, the 
role of the state was also important but mostly through horizontal policies (Giuliani et al. 
2011). While some degrees of vertical interventions occurred through the Servicio Agri-
cola Ganadero (SAG), which is in charge of quality inspection, horizontal interventions 
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mostly relied on CORFO and Pro-Chile (export promotion agency offering export credit 
and financing), besides the national initiatives of free trade agreements (e.g. the one with 
South Korea, which has become an important importer of Chilean wine as a result). They 
are horizontal as they were equally helping all sectors. For instance, the role of ProChile 
was also critical for fresh fruit exports.
In the absence of a state agency providing vertical help in innovation and upgrading, it 
was mostly FDI that helped the wine sector to emerge and upgrade its technology. Foreign 
investors, especially from Spain, enabled knowledge transfer related to functions like grape 
growing, wine making and wine marketing. This favoured access to distribution channels 
in the major markets and the improvement of the Chilean wine image (Björk 2005; Kunc 
2007; Kunc and Bas 2009). Overall, the wine industry constantly relied on flows of for-
eign oenologists and technology experts (Giuliani et  al. 2011) as well as companies. As 
explained in Agosín and Bravo-Ortega (2009), Innovation in the Chilean wine industry has 
been enabled by “learning by looking” through several ways, including the participation of 
foreign oenologists in the Chilean harvest season, but also in the foreign travel of Chilean 
oenologists and viticulturists to the international centers of winemaking (sometimes at the 
charge of government development agencies). However, it is important to note that, in the 
wine sector, many locally-controlled firms have eventually grown to become the dominant 
form of firm ownership in the sector. For instance, in 2004, only 40 out a total of 265 vine-
yards in Chile had some degree of foreign equity in their ownership structure, producing 
around 15% of the total value of Chile’s wine exports (Bustos et al. 2007). By the 2010 s, 
over 200 globally competitive Chilean-owned firms had emerged in the wine sector, with 
above USD 1 billion exports (Gwynne 2012).
In sum, public institutions and industrial policy have been key in the process of capa-
bilities accumulation that shaped the emergence of these new industries in Chile. This took 
the form of R&D support, funding for technical training and human capital accumulation, 
regulatory and quality control for export markets, trade promotion, and technology diffu-
sion, depending on each sector. These policies were often conceived as ‘vertical’ policies, 
explicitly targeting a sector. At other times, policies were designed to be horizontal, but 
given the country’s productive specialization, also turned out to be vertical.
4.2  Mixed success in the leading copper sector
While the copper sector has accounted for more than half of Chile’s total exports for the 
past decade, lower commodity prices have increased the vulnerability of the sector and 
have led to the decline of its trade surplus during 2011–2015 as shown in Fig. 5. While 
copper mining has represented the backbone of the Chilean economy, the efforts to diver-
sify vertically and upgrade have largely failed, as explained below. More worryingly, in 
contrast to the salmon sector for instance, Chile has not managed to develop large-scale 
knowledge intensive activities around copper extraction. In view of the strong emergence 
of new resource sectors, the mixed success of copper mining can be attributed to the lack 
of an explicit industrial policy.
There are several cases of local suppliers that successfully transitioned as top tier sup-
pliers in knowledge intensive services, (such as Neptuno Pumps, producing water pumps; 
ENAEX, producing blasting devices; DRILCO, producing drilling tools; and AguaMarina, 
producing bio-mining equipment) (Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz 2015; Pietrobelli et al. 2018; 
Lebdioui 2019a). These firms display high technological capabilities, international com-
petitiveness, as well as the accumulation of transversal capabilities useful for other sectors. 
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However, around 97% of mining suppliers still classify as displaying average or low capac-
ity in the use of technology, mainly through production management or adaptation of avail-
able technologies, while very few local suppliers operate at the knowledge frontier (Bravo-
Ortega and Muñoz 2015). Consequently, although the participation of Chilean mining 
suppliers has been increasing (and doubled since 2007), the level of exports, technological 
sophistication and knowledge intensity of supplies of goods and services around mining 
remain quite far from the levels reached in advanced resource-rich countries such as Aus-
tralia. As Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz (2015) and Pietrobelli et al. (2018) explain, most local 
suppliers operate in a context of very marginal improvements in production management 
and adaptations of available technologies, without any major technological improvements.
The weak growth of locally-owned firms has to do with the absence of explicit industrial 
policies providing incentives for local suppliers to innovate, as well as high level of competi-
tion from foreign suppliers, which constitutes an entry barrier and a disincentive for local 
suppliers’ upgrading and innovation (Pietrobelli et al. 2018). Most notably, the governance 
of the mining GVCs, in spite of a recent trend towards outsourcing, remains extremely hier-
archical, with a strong preference for incumbent suppliers, and with the lead firms’ persisting 
attitude to avoid the risks related to the search for local technological solutions on their sup-
pliers (Pietrobelli et al. 2018, Stubrin 2018, Lebdioui 2019a; Iizuka et al. 2020). Given this 
situation, a poor matching prevails between mining MNCs and the solutions developed by 
local suppliers (e.g. Bravo-Ortega and Muñoz 2015; Urzúa 2017; Lebdioui 2019a).
In sum, public incentives for innovation, and support for skilled human capital accumu-
lation have been largely lacking. There was no correction for capital market failures either. 
Although Chile’s banking system is highly developed, there seems to be a lack of comple-
mentarity between the financing sector and the needs of mining suppliers.9
Further, the mining sector lacks a state agency that would foster R&D, education and 
training, such as those in new resource sectors described above. Local universities do not 
contribute to the industry to a large extent (Confraria and Vargas 2019), and rarely offer 
human capital formation related to the fields of development of local providers (Bravo-
Ortega and Muñoz 2015).10 Moreover, R&D expenditures and researchers involved in the 
Chilean mining industry show a significant lag with respect to countries like Australia 
(Meller and Parodi 2017).
There have been recent efforts to address obstacles to the promotion of local suppli-
ers. Some of these efforts were initiated by the multinational company BHP Billiton (later 
joined by the state-owned mining company Codelco), to create the so-called World-Class 
Supplier program in 2008. The program’s primary objective was to promote the techno-
logical development of knowledge-intensive mining suppliers (KIMS) through increasing 
the demand for innovations, thereby solving coordination failures, and promoting interna-
tionalization.11 The results of the program are only partially positive, given that addressing 
9 “It is not just about the financing but also about the knowledge on the process of scaling up: where to 
manufacture, how to package, in what quantities, at which prices, and where to outsource? […] This is a 
challenge for small firms” (CEO of Aguamarina, cited in Lebdioui, 2019a).
10 Even Becas Chile, the government’s scholarship program, does not discriminate in favor of specific stra-
tegic areas, which has resulted in the lack of human capital accumulation in engineering (OECD and World 
Bank, 2011).
11 The program works as follows (for details see Iizuka et al. 2020, and Navarro, 2018). The mining com-
panies participating in the program identify a list of operational problems that a subcontractor could solve, 
and upload them on a website, managed by Fundación Chile. Selected companies are then invited to apply. 
Mining companies are expected to provide finally selected suppliers with access to facilities and non-pecu-
niary resources like technical assistance on production and commercialization during project development.
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Table 1  Ownership by sector in Chile during times of value addition. Source: Authors’ elaboration
Sector Current dominance of ownership of 
production
Comments
Mining Foreign Although the sector was nationalized in the 1970 s, foreign firms currently produce two-thirds of Chile’s 
overall mining output
Forestry (wood-based) Local Even though majority of foreign companies carried out investments in Chile through alliances with 
domestic companies already established within the sector. Since the mid-nineties, foreign investment in 
the sector continues to exist, but on a small scale (Borregaard et al. 2008)
Salmon Mixed FCh’s efforts have been most successful, and the salmon industry in the country is currently a thoroughly 
internationalized activity, with local and foreign firms.
Wine Local In 2004, 15% of vineyards in Chile had some degree of foreign equity in their ownership structure. This 
group of firms also produced around 15% of the total value of Chile’s wine exports (Bustos et al. 2007). 
However, the role of foreign experts and technology has been acknowledged (Giuliani et al. 2011)
Fruits Local In contrast to the widespread view that fruits cultivation in Chile has been dominated by MNCs, foreign 
firms only controlled about 23.6% of fresh fruits exports in 1984 and 30.5% in 1991 (Korzeniewicz 
et al. 1995). However, the State played an important role in the development of standards and in the 
logistics
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these market failures has had some impact on a selected group of suppliers (Iizuka et al. 
2020; Navarro 2018).12 Regardless the design and effectiveness of this program, the size of 
the interventions is not commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge it is seeking to 
address.
4.3  Summary discussion of Chile
The lessons from the Chilean case can be summarized as follows. First, in addition to mar-
ket forces, many industrial policy interventions have fostered the creation and strength-
ening of new non-traditional sectors based on natural resources. Importantly, this is very 
different from the usual narrative that paints Chile’s success as entirely due to liberalization 
and open markets.
Second, Chile has achieved upgrading into high value-added activities within commod-
ity sectors (a totally new activity, such as salmon harvesting, and a well-established one, 
like fresh fruit), without relying on foreign-dominated global value chains, but by instead 
transferring and adapting technology to local conditions. Except for mining, substan-
tial local ownership has emerged in successful resource sectors, even though to a varying 
degree (Table 1).
Third, efforts for value addition in the copper sector are still modest and most of the 
copper is exported as copper ore. This suggests that in the copper sector, Chile appears to 
be following the third “resource-rent maximization” pathway, with the high prices prevail-
ing in the early 2000 s helping its way out of the MIT. Indeed, refering to our conceptual 
model in Fig. 2, Chile may be more a combination of pathways 2 and 3 (resource-based 
development and resource-rent maximization) rather than only one pathway.
Fourth, the sectoral stories also signal the importance of managing the local-foreign 
interface strategically, recognizing the positive contribution, as well as the limitation, of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), especially to access foreign knowledge and technology.
In the next section, we will see if this synthesis also applies to Malaysia.
5  Industrial policy and upgrading in key sectors of Malaysia
In contrast to Chile, Malaysia is often perceived to have caught up by diversifying away 
from commodities. However, its manufacturing has not achieved much success as discussed 
in Sect.  2.2. Instead, Malaysia has recently been obtaining some success in promoting 
exports in commodity sectors that have existed since independence (Chang 2007).13 This 
differs from Chile’s resource-based development, which featured efforts to acquire capa-
bilities in ‘new’ commodity sectors (such as salmon farming and radiata pine production).
5.1  Industrial upgrading in resource sectors: petroleum, palm oil and rubber
Resource-based manufacturing in Malaysia consists of the production and export of rub-
ber-based products (such as latex goods and tyres), petroleum-based products (such as 
13 Neither rubber nor palm oil are native to Malaysia, as they were brought by the colonial administration.
12 The estimated pool of mining suppliers in the country ranges between 4500 to 6000 (Comisión Nacional 
de Productividad 2017). 31 of the 75 suppliers participating in the program had applied for patents before 
participating in the program (Navarro 2018)—a much higher percentage than the average Chilean firm.
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petrochemicals, plastics, fuel, synthetic rubber, etc.) and palm oil-based products (such as 
kernel cake and oleochemicals). These sectors together have become the leading engine of 
export growth, which is notably the result of government support through fiscal and R&D 
incentives, and quality control services (Lebdioui 2019b). In these sectors, the role of a 
state-owned firm, such as Petronas in petroleum sector, or of other public agencies, has 
been critical, such as Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB) in rubber, FELDA (Federal Land 
Development Agency) and the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB). What follows is an 
elaboration of each sector.
The petroleum sector of Malaysia was initially dominated by multinational oil com-
panies which remained the main providers of upstream technology in the early periods of 
resource exploitation, especially given the context of Malaysia’s technology-demanding 
offshore and deep-water fields.14 To overcome such situation, the government of Malaysia 
established a state-owned enterprise, Petronas, in 1974, which became possible by procla-
mation of the Petroleum Development Act (PDA), and the associated Production-Sharing 
Contracts (PSC). The objective of the PDA was to gain greater national control over petro-
leum resources, to provide affordable petroleum resources to the local market to form the 
basis for capital and energy-intensive industries, and to encourage production linkages in 
both upstream and downstream activities (Nordas et al. 2003). Petronas, the state-owned 
oil corporation, has also gradually developed capabilities and upgraded into higher value 
activities.
The government also initiated a holistic approach in industrial policy combining local 
content requirements, tax incentives, skills transfer (through technical and specialized uni-
versities), state-led investments and opportunities for learning (Lebdioui 2019a). These 
tools have been successful in enhancing the industrial capabilities of local suppliers by 
allowing local firms to benefit from more stable intra-industry relationships, exposure to 
best practices, quality standards, as well as marketing capabilities. This holistic approach 
led to the accumulation of the capabilities needed for knowledge intensive activities along 
the petroleum value chain.
Petronas was a key vehicle for such industrial policy drive as it ran a program like the 
Petronas Vendor Development Program to develop the capabilities of local suppliers. 
Petronas’ partners are also required to pay Petronas an annual research contribution, the 
“Research Cess” in order to promote joint R&D (PSC, Arts 9.1 and 9.2). Thus, growth of 
local companies followed that of Petronas, and 74% of total value of contracts in upstream 
activities in the petroleum sector was granted to local companies by 1995 (Tordo and 
Anouti 2013).15 Given the key role in promoting production linkages through several ini-
tiatives, it is doubtful whether similar value addition results would have been achieved if 
international oil corporations had controlled the sector. Petronas itself has grown into a 
fully integrated international oil and gas company, which operates in over 30 countries. It 
is now among the list of the global Fortune 500 companies.
In both rubber and palm oil sector, the plantations were all foreign-owned in the 
early days of the colonial period, and there was no interest in increasing domestic value-
added. The largely European-controlled plantation companies preferred to export crude 
palm oil and did not see many gains in relocating their vegetable oil processing facilities 
14 For instance, Shell and Mitsubishi fully carried out the technical development, sales and marketing of 
Malaysia’s first LNG plant (Nordas et. al 2003).
15 The Malaysian Plan does not, however, say how much of this was value added produced by locally 
owned firms, and how much was delivered by multinationals established in Malaysia (Nordas et al. 2003).
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in Malaysia. After the initial entry point into the foreign-dominated GVCs during colo-
nial times, Malaysia broke up those foreign-led GVCs with the nationalization of domes-
tic firms through a hostile takeover of three British palm oil and rubber plantation con-
glomerates listed in the London stock exchange by Malaysian public capital in 1981 
(Oikawa 2016; Lebdioui 2019b). The interest in processing palm oil and natural rubber 
locally increased since then. In addition, in the rubber sector, a large difference in purchas-
ing behavior can be noted between domestic and foreign firms. Foreign-owned firms have 
fewer forward and backward linkages with other manufacturers in Malaysia than domesti-
cally owned firms.
Interestingly, Malaysia’s efforts to stimulate industrial upgrading were met with coun-
ter-attacks from the incumbent firms. For instance, Malaysia’s export processed palm oil 
in the 1970 s were blocked by the European common market, which practiced tariff escala-
tion to make sure that refining capacity would remain in Europe. In order to counter the 
EU import duty structure, the Malaysian government had initially decided to introduce an 
export duty on crude palm oil production. After further tariffs escalation in the EU in the 
1990 s from about 100% in the 1970 s to more than 200% in the 1990 s (Gopal 2001), most 
market deals for Malaysian processed palm oil were signed through government-to-gov-
ernment partnerships under so-called barter arrangements. As a result of this barter trade 
that enabled to secure export markets, palm oil refining activities in Malaysia considerably 
increased and became the most competitive internationally within 10 years, achieving both 
economies of scale and scope.16 Such upgrading into exporting processed palm oil, rather 
than crude oil, would not have been possible if there was no change of ownership from 
foreign to local. Another important incentive for processing palm oil was the higher export 
taxes on crude oil and lower taxes for more processed oil, which made domestic prices of 
crude and processed oil deviate from the international market prices (Jomo and Rock 1998; 
Oikawa 2016).
Such upgrading in the palm oil sector has been backed by increased R&D efforts led 
by the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB)17 which has been responsible since the late 
1970  s for R&D on all palm oil-related activities, starting with chemistry, quality, ana-
lytical techniques, transportation and handling of palm oil products, and later expanded 
towards R&D in oleochemicals and processed palm kernel oil, following the recommenda-
tions of the Industrial Master Plans (Azhar 2009; Oikawa 2016).18 The financial support 
from the government for R&D also targeted such products, ranging from oleo-chemical by-
products to environment-friendly cultivation and manufacturing methods. Such R&D effort 
enabled firms to increase value added in existing products, as well as enabled the introduc-
tion of new products in markets (such as biodiesel, specialty fats and vitamin A) (Rasiah 
and Shahrin 2006). Government-funded R&D, through MPOB, has also been conducted to 
stimulate innovation towards oil palm biomass, but it is too soon to assess whether those 
efforts will be fruitful. Indeed, while considerable ground has been covered to pursue value 
addition towards processed palm oil and oleochemicals, further efforts are required to 
16 In the case of Palm oil, Malaysia had specialized in one type of oil (palm oil), while Europeans had 
no scope nor scale as they were processing different types of oils, according to the season (Jomo Kwame 
Sundaram, personal communication, cited in Lebdioui 2019b).
17 MPOB is the result of the merger between the former PORLA (Palm Oil Registration and Licensing 
Authority) and PORIM (Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia) (Oikawa 2016).
18 Research grants in the palm oil industry accounted to around USD 565 million between 2000 and 2010 
(Rasiah 2015).
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move towards highly sophisticated value-added palm oil-based products (such as biodiesel 
and specialty oleochemicals).
In the rubber sector, the Malaysian Rubber Board (MRB) has become the world lead-
ing authority in rubber-related R&D, and has accumulated expertise across the whole rub-
ber value chain, from cultivation, plantation management to rubber manufacturing tech-
niques and rubber products marketing (Goldthorpe 2015). Several Malaysian-owned firms 
have become world-leading producers for rubber-based products such as latex gloves and 
prophylactic goods, in highly competitive markets with low cost producers (i.e. China and 
India) and other natural rubber producing countries (i.e. Thailand and Vietnam).
5.2  Mixed success in the leading manufacturing sectors: E&E and automotive
In contrast to the successful upgrading in the three resource-based sectors reviewed above, 
the E&E industry in Malaysia reveals mixed success, despite its dominance in the export 
basket. This can be attributed to a combination of a lack of explicit industrial policy and of 
a critical mass of locally-owned firms vis-à-vis continuing dominance of MNCs in the sec-
tor. Again, dominance of MNCs implies less room for state intervention and less interests 
in building local capabilities, local suppliers and local linkages.
In the E&E sector, the government adopted a rather ‘minimalist’ approach, mostly pro-
viding basic infrastructure and government services, and promoting FDI by offering tax 
incentives and low wages (Rasiah 2017). The initial outcome was the successful growth of 
low value-added labor-intensive FDI-led manufacturing. However, such strategy was not 
sustainable in the long-term because Malaysia also faced rising wage rates, while other 
neighbouring countries were offering lower wages to attract FDI. As a result, the E&E 
sector in Malaysia was not innovative enough to compete against high-wage innovators 
from the top, and, at the same time, their wages were already too high to compete against 
low-wage manufacturers. This is the typical symptom of the middle-income trap (World 
Bank 2012), and some studies already discussed such possibility for Malaysia (Cherif and 
Hasanov 2019a; Rasiah 2006; Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009).
Such situation is partly due to the fact that there was no explicit industrial policy aiming 
at developing indigenous technologies in the E&E sector up until the 2000 s. The initial 
objective underlying the promotion of the E&E sector was indeed employment generation. 
It was only since the 2000 s that more efforts have been provided through the industrial 
master plans, tax incentives, R&D grants and state investments, to move domestic firms 
towards more value-added activities. For instance, in the semiconductor segment, targeted 
investments in high-end activities, such as chip design, wafer fabrication, and supportive 
R&D took place since 2005 (Rasiah 2017). Despite recent attempts to increase local con-
tent and manufacturing value added, the results, although tangible, remained limited (Siew 
Yean 2015; Lebdioui 2019c). Malaysia’s shares of global high-tech exports have decreased 
in the past decade, and Malaysia is losing its labour cost advantage to neighbouring coun-
tries (e.g. Vietnam). In the meantime, technology diffusion and domestic linkages remained 
constrained by the lack of technology transfer by MNCs in Malaysia (Cherif and Hasanov 
2019a; Raj-Reichert 2019).
The automotive sector of Malaysia is a completely different story, as it was subject to 
aggressive interventions, with infant industry protection, high tariffs and national owner-
ship. However, it has failed to grow into an internationally competitive sector. Such failure 
has to do with the presence of only carrots and the absence of sticks, which made industrial 
policy highly asymmetric. No sticks implied that two national brand carmakers (Proton 
Local-foreign technology interface, resource-based…
1 3
and Perodua) were not to compete with each other even in the domestic market, but to play 
in different segments (Tai and Ku 2013; Athukorala 2017). Neither were they pushed to 
export to the world market.
While there were some initiatives to promote local content and suppliers (Athukorala 
2017; Wad and Govindaraju 2011), the two flagship car makers did not pursue techno-
logical development, such as localization of production of engines and transmission, but 
kept using foreign-imported ones. In this light, they differed critically from the examples 
of Hyundai in South Korea or Geely in China, both of which pursued localization of key 
intermediate capital goods such as engines and transmissions (Lee and Lim 2001; Lee et al. 
2016). Thus, the two flagship national champions failed to take off, as shown by the very 
low RCA and trade deficits of transport sector (see “Appendix” Fig.  9). The two national 
makers thus faced no discipline from the international market to upgrade their innova-
tion capabilities, and the limited size of domestic markets prevented them from achieving 
economies of scale. Instead, these firms should have devoted the financial resources gained 
from quasi-monopoly profits to upgrading their technological capabilities to produce their 
own engines, which did not happen given the context.
While we argue that the industrial policy in automotive can be considered as ill-
designed and lacking the incentives to induce to localize engines and transmission, one 
qualification is in order. The technological barriers to entry are much higher in the automo-
bile engines or transmission than in palm oil processing. The latter is capital intensive, but 
uses mature technologies that are easily available in the market. Furthermore, Malaysia’s 
natural environment clearly contributes to its competitive advantage in palm oil plantations 
(Oikawa 2016).
5.3  Summary discussion of Malaysia
The discussion in the preceding sub-sections suggests a couple of lessons. First, there are 
common elements of success in the three resource-intensive sectors (rubber, petroleum, 
palm oil): a similar combination of industrial policy and eventual growth of locally-con-
trolled firms. In the Malaysian case, the role of local ownership is very explicit for all three 
sectors (Table 2). Second, the experience of the automotive sector suggests that a strong 
export-orientation should be added as a requirement for success.
6  Concluding remarks
Several findings emanate from our study. Firstly, Chile and Malaysia are on the path of 
escaping the middle-income trap in terms of their income level compared to the USA. Sec-
ondly, their leading export engines are not only traditional sectors, such as E&E in Malay-
sia or mining in Chile, but also ′new′ resource-based sectors, such as such as petroleum, 
rubber and palm oil in Malaysia, and salmon, fruits, wine and forestry in Chile. Thirdly, the 
sustained growth of these export sectors has been possible not through free-markets alone, 
but due to industrial policy fostering the build-up and accumulation of productive and 
innovation capabilities. In both Chile and Malaysia, industrial policies have offered R&D 
support, fiscal incentives, export assistance, and quality control to foster industrial upgrad-
ing towards higher value products and activities. The cases analyzed here show clearly that 
such upgrading requires government interventions. In particular, given the possibility of a 
different kind of resource curse—a price boom reinforcing the prevailing export of crude 
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Table 2  Ownership by sector in Malaysia. Source: Authors’ elaboration
Sector Current Dominance of owner-
ship of production
Comments
Petroleum Local The state-owned company remains the majority shareholder in petroleum extraction operations through 
production sharing agreements with MNCs
Palm oil & rubber Local Used to be foreign owned but have been locally owned since a de facto nationalization in the 1980 s
Electronics & electrical Foreign E&E output is dominated by MNCs and the overwhelming majority of investments in the sector are still 
FDI (MITI 2017)
Automotive Mostly Local Technically, automotive companies have been locally owned but the production units have often been 
dominated by foreign ownership (while sales unit have been domestically owned)
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or unprocessed commodities (e.g. crude palm oil) but discouraging the desired transition to 
export of processed commodities (Sato 2016)—, ‘getting prices wrong’ by taxes, subsidies 
or regulation may be necessary.
Fourthly, we also find that the eventual emergence of locally-controlled firms is an 
important aspect of this long-term success, although the sources of initial learning impor-
tantly included foreign actors and FDI. Indeed, as clearly shown by the case of palm oil 
and rubber in Malaysia, the local control of raw materials enabled these countries to gain 
leverage to promote local value addition. This is consistent with the early insights by Ams-
den (1989) that foreign investments and MNCs can be important channels to access for-
eign knowledge, but tend to interfere with the eventual growth of indigenous technological 
capabilities. Overall, the Malaysian and Chilean experiences are also consistent with the 
nonlinear pattern of the GVC participation in Lee et al. (2018), which emphasizes the tran-
sient separation from GVC at the middle-income stages, so as to increase domestic value-
added and to develop technological capabilities.
Finally, because the cases of Chile and Malaysia show the possibility of escaping the 
middle-income trap not through manufacturing but through natural resource-based sectors, 
a key contribution of this study is to reveal that there can be alternative pathways for coun-
tries to escape the middle-income trap. The first is based on the idea of catching up by 
developing technological capabilities in short cycle technology manufacturing or service 
sectors, with low-entry barrier and analysed in Lee (2013). While another escape would 
be based on high commodity rents per capita in country such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, or 
Equatorial Guinea, it might not be really sustainable in the long term as it is highly vulner-
able to commodity price fluctuations. Thus, an alternative (also resource-based) pathway 
out of the MIT is a gradual way to exercise consistent industrial policy to promote linkages 
and technological capabilities around resource-based industries, rather than resource rents 
alone. Our contribution is therefore the analysis of this alternative route with the example 
of the resource-based sectors in Chile and Malaysia, which appear to have constituted the 
low-entry barrier industries proposed by Lee (2013). This is somewhat different from the 
early arguments by Latin American scholars (Perez 2010) that Latin America should uti-
lize resource-based development to leapfrog into emerging technologies. If our argument 
proves true, the Chilean and Malaysian cases suggest that the resource sectors could be the 
ultimate leading sectors generating intra-sectoral diversification and deepening in value-
chains, and not just transitional sectors leading diversification into manufacturing sectors.
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